It was not, perhaps, entirely unexpected. The removal of former Chinese president Hu Jintao from the proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party triggered a wave of interpretations, particularly in the absence of any meaningful public debate within China.

One explanation, the most benign, points to a health-related episode. At 79, Hu may have felt unwell during the session and required assistance to leave the hall and recover. Yet this account raises questions. Although visibly aged, Hu has not been widely regarded as suffering from serious health issues that would necessitate such an abrupt intervention. Moreover, his apparent confusion as he was escorted out suggests that the episode may not have been purely medical.

A second, more intermediate interpretation centers on political precaution. It is conceivable that Xi Jinping had received indications that his predecessor might not fully endorse the outcomes being formalized, particularly in a setting where unanimity is carefully staged. Ensuring Hu’s absence at a critical moment would have eliminated even the remote possibility of visible dissent.

A third, more severe reading sees the incident as deliberate and coercive. Hu’s demeanor as he was led away—hesitant, seemingly unwilling—has been interpreted as evidence of a calculated act. In this view, Xi sought to send a broader message: that challenges to his authority, whether overt or subtle, would not be tolerated. The signal may have been directed not only at Hu, but also at an earlier predecessor, Jiang Zemin.

Xi Jinping is, in many respects, a product of his political inheritance. Before ascending to power, he displayed deference toward the so-called party elders, shaped in part by the experience of his father, Xi Zhongxun, himself a senior figure who was purged during earlier political struggles. Once in power, however, Xi appears to have recalibrated that posture. Respect gave way to caution, and, arguably, to preemption. The fear of suffering a similar fate may have driven a strategy aimed at neutralizing potential rivals before they could coalesce.

Within this framework, Hu Jintao represents only a limited concern. Since stepping down in 2012, he has maintained a notably low profile and lacks the extensive patronage networks associated with earlier leaders. By contrast, Jiang Zemin, despite his advanced age and declining health, retains residual influence through the so-called Shanghai faction, a network of officials with enduring institutional ties. Some among this cohort could, in time, pose a challenge to Xi’s concentration of power.

Other senior figures add to the uncertainty. Zhu Rongji, who served as premier under Jiang, has been expected by some observers to voice criticism of Xi’s economic direction, particularly the stringent “zero-COVID” policy. Even symbolic dissent from such figures could carry weight in elite political circles.

Factional dynamics further complicate the picture. Hu Jintao was associated with the Communist Youth League, a once-prominent grouping that has been largely sidelined under Xi. The Shanghai faction, by contrast, has proven more resilient. Policies such as the prolonged lockdown in Shanghai may have had the dual effect of public health control and the political weakening of local elites tied to that network.

Absent the highly personalized leadership style that has reemerged under Xi, arguably the most pronounced since the era of Mao Zedong, China’s leadership succession might have followed a different trajectory, potentially favoring figures linked to the Shanghai faction. Xi’s consolidation of authority has altered that calculus.

Historical precedent looms large in this context. During the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, internal divisions and mass demonstrations prompted paramount leader Deng Xiaoping to recall a group of veteran revolutionaries, the so-called Eight Immortals, to restore order and reassert control. Their intervention ultimately sidelined then-Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who, despite his formal position, lacked the decisive backing of the elder leadership.

Xi may see himself in a position analogous to Deng’s, seeking to prevent the emergence of an alternative center of power. At the same time, he may be equally determined to avoid Zhao’s fate: marginalized by a coalition of senior figures capable of reshaping the political landscape from behind the scenes.

In this light, the removal of Hu Jintao can be read as more than an isolated incident. It becomes a symbolic act, underscoring a broader principle: that political authority in contemporary China is increasingly centralized, and that former leaders must reconcile themselves to diminished roles. Those who fail to do so may face consequences, not necessarily formal, but unmistakably public.

Bibliography:

Andrew J. Nathan, The Alternate History of China (Review Essay), Foreign Affairs Magazine, September/October 2022, Book Review: "Never Turn Back" by Julian Gewirtz | Foreign Affairs

James Palmer, What the Hell Just Happened to Hu Jintao?, Foreign Policy Magazine, October 22nd, 2022, Did Xi Jinping Just Purge Hu Jintao at China's Party Congress? (foreignpolicy.com)

Julian Gewirtz, China's Road Not Taken, Foreign Affairs Magazine, September 29th, 2022, China’s Road Not Taken: How the Chinese Communist Party Rewrites History (foreignaffairs.com)

Melinda Liu, The Party Elders Who May Challenge Xi, Foreign Policy Magazine, October 13th, 2022, CCP Congress: Party Elders May Challenge Xi Jinping (foreignpolicy.com)