The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China was, by most accounts, an exceptional political moment. Yet its significance lies less in inaugurating a new epoch than in consolidating a trajectory already well underway. The departure from Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing doctrine of reform and opening, paired with a discernible return to statism in domestic governance, did not begin at the Congress itself. Rather, the proceedings confirmed a shift that has been unfolding for at least a decade. What emerged, therefore, was not the coronation of a new era, but the reaffirmation and intensification of an existing one.

Two dynamics help explain why the Congress ultimately reflected continuity rather than rupture in the era of Xi Jinping. First, ideology has remained central to Xi’s vision of governance. Contrary to widespread assumptions in the West, that a socialist state deeply embedded in global markets would treat ideology as rhetorical ornament, Xi has consistently demonstrated a firm commitment to Marxist-Leninist principles. His repeated invocation of “Marxism” and “struggle” during the Congress speech underscored this orientation, reinforcing expectations of a more conflict-driven approach in his new mandate.

In many respects, however, such an approach is already evident. Domestically, Xi’s “struggles” have taken shape in multiple arenas: the faltering economic reforms of the 2012-2016 period, policies toward Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the tightening of state control over major technology firms. These efforts have collectively advanced a more statist economic model, drawn international criticism for repression in China’s western regions, and imposed a more party-directed framework on technological development. Externally, Xi’s strategic competition with the United States has ushered in a new phase of great-power rivalry, one that has strained relations with Washington and unsettled the broader Indo-Pacific.

Second, the Congress illuminated the priorities that will define the leadership’s mandate. The language employed, often a reliable guide for party cadres, points to a recalibration of focus. At the 14th Party Congress in 1992, during Deng’s tenure, references to “economics” appeared nearly 195 times. By contrast, at the 20th Congress, the term surfaced only around 60 times. Meanwhile, “national security”, mentioned just once in 1992, appeared 27 times in 2022. The shift is unmistakable: security now occupies a more prominent place than economic development.

Yet even this reordering is not without precedent. As early as 2014, amid mounting frustrations among reform-oriented economic officials over stalled reforms, Xi introduced the “comprehensive national security concept”, warning that China faced “the most complicated internal and external factors in its history”. The Congress thus reaffirmed a transition already in motion.

Personnel changes further reinforced this direction. The departure of reform-minded figures such as Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, both below the customary retirement threshold, signaled a diminishing role for economic pragmatists. This development echoes a broader pattern: over the past decade, Xi has sidelined rivals through anti-corruption campaigns that have also served to consolidate political authority. What is new, however, is the marginalization of the economic primacy that has guided China’s development since 1978.

Against this backdrop, the removal of Hu Jintao from the Congress floor appears less anomalous. It was likely tied to his reluctance to endorse a transformation that displaced the economic legacy associated with his tenure. As his protégés exited the political stage, replaced by figures aligned with Xi’s ideological orientation, the contours of China’s evolving political order became unmistakably clear, and Xi was fully aware of the implications.

Bibliography:

Daniel H. Rosen, China`s Economic Reckoning, Foreign Affairs Magazine July/August 2021, A Reckoning for the Chinese Economy | Foreign Affairs.

Jude Blanchette, Xi`s Gamble, Foreign Affairs Magazine, July/August 2021, Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave Off Disaster (foreignaffairs.com).

Kevin Rudd, The Return of Red China, Foreign Affairs Magazine, November 9th, 2022, The Return of Red China: Xi Jinping Brings Back Marxism (foreignaffairs.com).