Introduction

Ever since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, the relations between Turkey and the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria have gone from improving (under Ankara's zero problems with its neighbours between 2007 and 2010) to high tensions once Turkey's main concern in the region became its support for regime change in Damascus. But once Assad has proven the word he is nowhere to go (after the support received from Russia and Iran), ten years after the Syrian Arab Spring, the normalization of the devastated state in the Levant took a different turn than what was expected for a decade before. Assad regained control over most of the country and the Arab League at the meeting of the Council in Cairo decided to reinstate the membership of Damascus in May 2023. Against the background of the normalization of relations between Syria and the rest of the Arab world, Ankara announced a new foreign policy pivot, from changing Assad to embracing Assad in Syria. A rapprochement of relations between Ankara and Damascus implies a mix of consequences given the complex history of the cold conflict between the two. In a nutshell, there are winners and losers from any positive diplomatic outcome between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian Bashar al-Assad.

The winning side of the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, Turkey has faced a considerable wave of Syrian immigrants fleeing the war and seeking protection in the Turkish state. Ankara was more than supportive given its harsh political critique and stance oriented towards the Assad regime. You cannot claim your foreign policy strategy towards regime change in Damascus and keep those who flee Syria because of Assad away from entering Turkey on a humanitarian basis. But the number of Syrians (estimated around 4 million today) on the Turkish territory has grown alarmingly, putting popular pressure on the political class in Ankara and especially on Erdogan's mandate, since the Turks consider that the financial resources of the state have been directed to the protection of the Syrian population in Turkey and less on the needs of the Turks. Thus, in recent years, Turkey has taken seriously the potential of negotiations with Syria regarding the repatriation of a certain number of Syrians from Turkey. Given his desire to show the whole world the normalization of Syria through the lens of the return of its nationals home, Assad might be willing to give in to Turkey's intentions, but with a condition.

From 2012 onwards, Ankara has financially and tactically supported the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a big-tent coalition of decentralized Syrian opposition rebel groups in the Syrian civil war aimed to bring Assad down. Ankara's support for the group led to the resilience of the FSA over ten years, during which the military forces of the regime reclaimed almost all the Syrian territory. Any endorsement of Syrian repatriation proposed by Turkey could therefore be conditioned by Ankara's acceptance of withdrawing its support to the FSA, as well as the retreat of the Turkish army from north-western Syria where it maintains since 2016 a strategic stronghold close to the border with Turkey. Ankara claims that its position is beneficial for eliminating the Kurdish threat along the Turkish-Syrian border and preventing the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) fighters from entering the Turkish territory from Syria.

A repatriation of the Syrian population from Turkey would benefit the European Union, which in the wake of the civil war in Syria, faced its own waves of refugees. An agreement with Turkey regulated the number of arrivals on EU territory but at the price of turning Turkey into a soaked sponge always ready to be squeezed if Brussels does not always endorse Turkey's claims.

The big winners of the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement are, as expected, Russia and Iran, Assad's patron saints. With the support from Moscow and Tehran, the leader in Damascus managed not only to survive but to maintain his regime in a country strategically positioned in the region (especially for Iran). But as Iran is concerned, it remains to be seen if Bashar al-Assad will ever accept Tehran's use of Syria as a medical cordon to support Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The losing side of the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation

The big losers of the normalization between Turkey and Assad are definitely the FSA who might see their main supporter oscillating towards withdrawal and thus abandoning the group in the hands of Assad. Once Turkey leaves north-western Syria, it is expected that the regime's army will advance in recapturing the area from the rebels. Even worse, due to influences of the Turkish army, the FSA has often reduced its operations against the regime, instead maximizing the insurgents directed at the Kurdish-majority SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), thus contributing nothing to the initial objective, namely weakening the regime's military capabilities.

Other unfortunate players losing from the reconciliation, could be the SDF. A long-standing US ally in fighting the ISIS in Syria, the Kurdish-dominated SDF has been continuously targeted by Turkey as being linked to the PKK in Syria. Given the possibility of a Trump 2.0 administration in the White House from January 2025 and the withdrawal of US troops from Syria started during his tenure, the SDF could be sidelined by the American ally in the same way as the FSA by its Turkish backer. Without the US support, a furious Turkish (or even a joint Turkish-Syrian) attack on the Kurds in the SDF is only a deal with Assad away from occurring.

Conclusion

Considering the existing circumstances, the possibility of a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus can be realistic given both the leverage that one has over the other, as well as the stake. But even if this is possible, that doesn't mean it will be easy. As far as the Turkish side is concerned, the repatriation of Syrian refugees who came to Turkey at least 10 years ago is more difficult to implement. Many Syrian families started a new life in Turkey, acquired Turkish citizenship and their children have never known the country where Erdogan wants to transfer them to through a simple agreement. Moreover, the normalization of relations with Assad will lead to political criticism of Erdogan from the domestic opposition, which will certainly bring into question Turkey's foreign policy in Syria in the last 10 years and what has been achieved. On the other side, with or without Turkey, the definitive elimination of the FSA by the regime will not only be a long fight to go but also with unpleasant consequences for the population of a country that has already gone through too much. As far as the European Union is concerned, cheerleading a transfer of the Syrian population from Turkey with European aspirations to Syria where political abuses have triggered a devastating conflict for the population and without the expected result would not look good on a humanitarian basis. Iran and Russia won with Assad a durable and indisputable ally in the Levant, but it remains to be seen if Damascus will ever allow Tehran to send support to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, while it is uncertain how Moscow will use Assad's Syria as a geopolitical asset in the region. Last but not least, while the US under Trump is likely to withdraw any American presence from Syrian soil, the consequences of abandoning the SDF would haunt American foreign policy in the region and confirm the decline of the US in the Middle East following its 2021 past abandonment of the allied Afghan regime in the hands of the Taliban. A possible Trump administration could re-evaluate its position on the SDF.

Bibliography:

Sinan Ciddi, "Why Is Turkey Cozying Up to Syria?", Foreign Policy Magazine, July 29, 2024, Why Is Turkey Cozying Up to Syria? – Foreign Policy.

Sinan Ciddi, "Erdogan Has No Choice but to Reconcile With Assad", Foreign Policy Magazine, September 5, 2023, Will Turkey's Erdogan and Syria's Assad Meet? (foreignpolicy.com).