The history of relations between Iran and the United States will be engraved as beginning in 1953, the year in which the CIA orchestrated a coup that led to the demise of Mohammad Mosaddegh and his replacement with a regime favourable to the interests of the Anglo-sphere bloc. Mosaddegh was assimilated by the large Iranian population as a symbol of Iranian nationalism and a protector of Iranian interests against British imperialism that has been present for a century. The British imperialism in Iran began in the 19th century with the economic penetration of Iran (then Persia) with the signing of the Treaty of Paris (1857) which set the terms for Persian ``capitulations`` and the sale of important concessions.[1] Perhaps the largest such concession was the exclusive right to drill for oil in the Iranian southwest given to a British subject named William Knox D'Arcy. The D`Arcy Concession set the ground for the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later Anglo-Iranian Oil Company - AIOC) formed in 1908 and which became the apple of discord in the first half of the 20th century between Persian nationalistic emancipation raised by the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) and the British increased imperialism in Iran set in motion by the signing of the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement.[2] For many Iranians, the AIOC has become a symbol of historical humiliation, the presence of imperialist forces, the exploitation of national resources and an obstacle to the recovery of Iranian dignity.[3] Moreover, this economic exploitation was assessed by the net higher value of the taxes that AIOC paid to the British Ministry of Finance compared to the modest amount paid to the Iranian government in the form of royalties.[4] The feeling of injustice, combined with a political renaissance and the identification of a common grievances and foreign threat among the Iranian population in the second half of the 1940s caused by the invasion and occupation of Iran by Allied forces in the first half of the 1940s and sparked by the 1949 announcement of a new oil agreement favourable to the AIOC, led to the denunciation of AIOC and the demand of a more equitable terms.[5] All this led to the rise of new political figures and parties to denounce the old `social contract` between the Shah and the AIOC.
Mohammad Mosaddegh, a liberal democrat and ardent nationalist known for his political views that the Shah must "reign and not rule" and that the only way Iran can regain its national dignity is through taking control of its oil production, became the flag bearer of a new social class in Iran, more aware of the injustices caused by the presence of foreign forces on its territory and more politicized than ever.[6] Once Mosaddegh`s National Front entered the Majles and Mosaddegh was appointed prime minister, the nationalization bill of the Iranian oil industry was signed into law, followed by the creation of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and negotiations with AIOC for the smooth transfer of control. [7] [8] The British protested the nationalization and even considered the option of removing Mosaddegh from office.[9] But a British-sponsored coup would have been difficult once Mosaddegh broke off diplomatic relations with London. The British needed the US to shoulder the responsibility and the only way to involve them in Iran was through exploiting the US paranoia and fears of a communist takeover.[10] The 1950s were the peak of the US-USSR rivalry modelled by the Korean War, McCarthy congressional hearings and the election of Dwight Eisenhower, the US president who made the threat of the USSR and Soviet ideological expansion a key issue of his election in 1952.[11] Eisenhower strengthened the Atlantic Alliance and increased the US influence in other parts of the world. Taking all these, the removal of Mosaddegh from office, a leader who, according to US anxieties became increasingly autocratic and dependent on the Iranian communists of the Tudeh Party, seemed to be the right motives behind CIA-sponsored coup in 1953.[12] According to Ali M. Ansari for Americans, ``the protection of Western commercial assets around the world and the fear of communism`` became the goals of the new US administration in Iran.[13] ``The Western commercial asset`` that the US had to protect in Iran was the Iranian oil production represented by the AIOC. For D. Eisenhower, the involvement of American companies in Iranian oil production was exponential in maintaining Iranian stability and keeping Tehran away from Soviet influence and a possible communist takeover.[14] On the other hand, there are debates over a possible business reason behind the CIA-orchestrated coup. For the US oil companies the coup was favoured because it could be followed by an increase in their shares in the Iranian oil production. But no matter how rational these reasons may be, the US companies were not interested in Iran during this period, all the more so as the decline in Iranian oil production was offset by a symmetrical increase in oil production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Secondly, an increase in oil production in Iran through an increase in shares obtained in the Iranian oil industry by the same American companies would lead to a proportional decrease in oil production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, causing tensions between officials of US oil companies and Arab political leaders. Thirdly, the peak of Iranian nationalism between 1950-1953 caused by the AIOC made any share in the Iranian oil production to seem a bit too risky.[15]
In conclusion, the oil nationalization movement represented the outcome of years of discontent among the Iranian population who saw the takeover of the oil industry as the only way to regain national dignity. Thus, the oil nationalization bill signed into law by Mohammad Mosaddeq became the apple of discord between Iranian nationalism and British imperialism. The British reacted promptly and tried to bring the United States on its side by exploiting Washington`s fears and paranoia of a communist takeover in Iran caused by an increasingly authoritarian Mosaddeq who in turn was radicalized by his fear of a possible coup.[16] The 1953 CIA-sponsored coup was produced at the peak of the Cold War making the removal of the communist-perceived Mosaddeq a foreign policy goal for the anti-Soviet Eisenhower administration who tried to scale back the Soviet influence in Iran by getting a serious American footprint in Iranian internal affairs, either politically, by facilitating the appointment of an American-friendly government, or economically through American oil companies with higher shares in Iranian oil production.[17]
[1] Ervand Abrahamian, A History Of Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 37-38.
[2] Ibidem, p. 40.
[3] Ali M. Ansari, ``Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the roots of mistrust``, Hurst & Company, London, p. 26.
[4] Ibidem.
[5] Ibidem.
[6] Ibidem, p. 29.
[7] Mark J. Gasiorowski, ``The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran``, International Journal of Middle East Studies, August, 1987, Vol. 19, No. 3 1987), p. 262.
[8] Ervand Abrahamian, A History Of Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 120.
[9] Mark J. Gasiorowski, ``The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran``, International Journal of Middle East Studies, August, 1987, Vol. 19, No. 3 1987), p. 263.
[10] Ali M. Ansari, ``Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the roots of mistrust``, Hurst & Company, London, pp. 34-35.
[11] Ibidem, p. Mark J. Gasiorowski, ``The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran``, International Journal of Middle East Studies, August, 1987, Vol. 19, No. 3 1987), pp. 275-276.
[12] Ibidem.
[13] Ali M. Ansari, ``Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the roots of mistrust``, Hurst & Company, London, p. 35.
[14] Mark J. Gasiorowski, ``The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran``, International Journal of Middle East Studies, August, 1987, Vol. 19, No. 3 1987), p. 275.
[15] Ibidem, pp. 275-276.
[16] Ali M. Ansari, ``Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the roots of mistrust``, Hurst & Company, London, p. 35.
[17] Ibidem, pp. 275-276.
Bibliography:
Abrahamian, Ervand, A History Of Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Ansari, M. Ali, ``Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the roots of mistrust``, Hurst & Company, London.
Gasiorowski, J. Mark, ``The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran``, International Journal of Middle East Studies, August, 1987, Vol. 19, No. 3 1987).
