I. Early Foundations: Pragmatism Before Ideology (1948-1979)

At first glance, the idea of an Israeli-Iranian conflict stretching back to the origins of modern Middle Eastern politics appears almost intuitive. Today, the two states are engaged in what many analysts describe as a “shadow war”, characterized by indirect confrontation, cyber operations, and proxy conflict. Yet for roughly the first three decades after Israel’s establishment in 1948, the relationship between Israel and Iran was not openly adversarial but cautiously pragmatic and strategically cooperative. Understanding this apparent paradox requires situating the relationship within the broader Cold War framework and the regional dynamics of Arab nationalism.

Following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, most Middle Eastern states refused recognition. Iran voted against the 1947 UN Partition Plan and did not extend full formal diplomatic recognition in the manner of Western states. However, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran began maintaining de facto ties with Israel in the early 1950s, including commercial, diplomatic, and security contacts. Over time, geopolitical considerations, particularly concerns about regional power balances and Soviet influence, outweighed earlier ideological reservations.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel pursued what became known as the “Periphery Doctrine”,  associated with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. This strategy sought to counterbalance hostile Arab states by cultivating relationships with non-Arab regional powers, most notably Turkey and Iran. For Iran, the rise of Arab nationalism under Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and the potential expansion of Soviet influence through revolutionary Arab movements were perceived as strategic threats.

The two states developed discreet but meaningful cooperation. Israel provided agricultural expertise, technical assistance, and elements of military and intelligence collaboration. Iran became an important oil supplier to Israel, particularly significant following the 1967 Six-Day War and during periods of Arab oil pressure. Intelligence services, notably Mossad and SAVAK,  reportedly maintained close working relations, although much of this cooperation remained covert and was only later documented.

The partnership was not ideological but strategic. Both regimes were aligned with the United States within the broader Cold War architecture and viewed radical Arab regimes and Soviet expansionism as destabilizing forces. The relationship remained largely unofficial and low-profile, reflecting Iran’s need to avoid domestic and regional backlash. Nevertheless, until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Israel and Iran functioned as quiet strategic partners within a shared geopolitical framework.

The rupture that followed was not the product of gradual deterioration but of revolutionary transformation.

References:

Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007).

Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford University Press, 2009).

Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Mark Gasiorowski, “U.S.-Iranian Relations in the 1950s,” International Journal of Middle East Studies.

Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy Since the Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

II. Moments of Cooperation: Strategic Convergence After the Revolution

The 1979 Islamic Revolution fundamentally reoriented Iran’s ideological posture toward Israel. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared Israel illegitimate and cast it as a Western colonial outpost in Muslim lands. Diplomatic relations were severed, and the Israeli embassy in Tehran was handed over to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

However, the narrative of uninterrupted hostility oversimplifies the early post-revolutionary period. In the 1980s, limited and covert contacts emerged, driven by strategic necessity rather than reconciliation.

The most prominent example was the Iran-Contra affair in the mid-1980s. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Israel regarded Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a significant regional threat. Iraq had participated in Arab wars against Israel and maintained substantial military capabilities. Iran, though ideologically hostile to Israel, was at war with Iraq. Israeli policymakers calculated that weakening Iraq served Israel’s security interests.

In this context, Israel facilitated arms transfers to Iran, some coordinated with the United States. The logic was not ideological alignment but balance-of-power pragmatism. For Iran, internationally isolated and under intense military pressure, the need for weapons temporarily outweighed ideological rigidity.

This episode illustrates that under extreme strategic pressures, ideological hostility can be subordinated to immediate security interests. However, such convergence was narrow, time-bound, and transactional. After the 1980s, relations reverted to sustained hostility, including Iran’s support for anti-Israel armed groups.

In later years, both states opposed Sunni jihadist organizations such as ISIS, but their opposition occurred independently and without coordination, often within separate and competing strategic frameworks.

References:

Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance (Yale University Press, 2007).

Gary Sick, October Surprise (Random House, 1991).

Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran (Times Books, 2006).

Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Iran–Contra Affair,” Middle East Journal.

Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (W.W. Norton, 2006).

III. From Ideological Rivalry to Shadow War: Drivers of Conflict

From the early 1990s onward, Israeli-Iranian relations consolidated into structured and enduring hostility. While antagonism dates back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rivalry became strategically institutionalized after the Iran-Iraq War. The conflict evolved across three main dimensions: ideological antagonism, nuclear proliferation concerns, and regional proxy competition.

1. Ideological Framing

The Islamic Republic embedded opposition to Israel within its revolutionary identity and foreign policy doctrine. Support for Palestinian armed movements, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and later Hamas, became central components of Iranian regional strategy. Israel, in turn, increasingly framed Iran as its most serious long-term strategic threat.

Unlike the territorial Arab-Israeli wars of the 20th century, the Israeli-Iranian rivalry does not center on direct territorial claims between the two states. Rather, it is strategic and ideological, revolving around legitimacy, deterrence, and regional influence, especially in Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian arena.

2. The Nuclear Question

By the early 1990s, Israeli leadership had begun focusing more intensively on Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli officials argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an existential threat to the Israeli state. The issue became particularly acute during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and later during debates surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.

Israel opposed the JCPOA, arguing that it imposed time-limited restrictions and would ultimately leave Iran with nuclear threshold capabilities while strengthening Tehran economically. Iran maintained that its program was peaceful and civilian in nature. Following U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent reduction of compliance, the nuclear file re-emerged as a central destabilizing factor in the rivalry.

3. Regional Proxy Warfare

The most operationally acute dimension of the conflict today is indirect warfare. Iran has developed a network of allied non-state actors, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Syria and Iraq, and longstanding ties to Palestinian armed groups. Israel has responded with sustained air operations in Syria targeting Iranian infrastructure, weapons transfers, and affiliated militias.

This “shadow war” has included cyber operations, covert actions, targeted killings, maritime incidents, and sabotage. Although the confrontation has largely remained below the threshold of open interstate war, it carries persistent escalation risk.

The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent regional escalation intensified scrutiny of Iran’s role. While Iran denied direct operational involvement, its financial, military, and political support for Hamas and Hezbollah became central to Israeli strategic calculations.

The rivalry has thus evolved into a multi-layered confrontation spanning ideology, deterrence, intelligence, cyber operations, proxy militias, and regional power projection.

References:

Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (Random House, 2004).

Suzanne Maloney, Iran Reconsidered (Brookings Institution).

International Crisis Group Reports on Israel/Iran/Syria (various).

Amos Yadlin and Assaf Orion, “Israel’s Strategy Toward Iran,” Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,” Foreign Affairs.

Meir Javedanfar, analyses in Middle East Policy journal.

Conclusion - The Future Trajectory: Escalation, Containment, or Managed Rivalry?

The future of Israeli-Iranian relations hinges on structural forces rather than short-term political leadership. Several scenarios are plausible.

First, continued managed hostility is the most likely trajectory. Both states have demonstrated an ability to engage in calibrated escalation without crossing into full-scale war. Deterrence, despite volatility, has held.

Second, escalation risk remains significant. A miscalculation, particularly involving Hezbollah, Syria, or direct strikes on Iranian soil, could trigger rapid regional war. The growing sophistication of missile and drone capabilities narrows warning times and increases miscalculation probability.

Third, broader regional normalization between Israel and Arab states (such as the Abraham Accords) complicates Iran’s strategic environment. Tehran may intensify asymmetric tools in response to perceived encirclement.

Fourth, the nuclear file remains the most dangerous flashpoint. If Iran approaches nuclear weapons capability, Israel may consider direct military action. Conversely, renewed diplomatic frameworks could stabilize the confrontation, though mutual distrust runs deep.

Ultimately, the Israeli-Iranian conflict is not cyclical but structural. It reflects competing regional visions: one state seeking to preserve military superiority and integration with Western and regional partners, the other positioning itself as leader of an anti-Western resistance axis.

Absent regime change, comprehensive reconciliation is unlikely. However, outright war is also improbable so long as deterrence logic prevails. The relationship will likely remain adversarial, indirect, and strategically cautious-defined less by formal declarations and more by shadow engagements.

References:

Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky, analyses in Foreign Affairs.

Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Institution reports on Iran’s regional strategy.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Middle East Security Assessments.

International Crisis Group, “Israel/Iran Shadow War” briefings.

Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation (Doubleday, 2013).