A Venezuela of the Middle East?
The first miscalculation made by the United States in Iran was to generalize a potential intervention in the Islamic Republic based on the Venezuelan model. According to this logic, a military intervention in Iran would be rapid and direct, designed to remove the leadership at relatively low cost, after which Washington could declare victory domestically while promoting a favourable political transition. However, the conflict, now ongoing for five weeks already, demonstrates that Iran represents a far more difficult challenge.
In contrast to Venezuela, Iran does not possess a clearly identifiable opposition leader, an equivalent to Delcy Rodríguez, who commands sufficient political and territorial capital to consolidate authority. A potential analogue that Donald Trump might have thought to pursue, following the Venezuelan model, would involve strengthening the political standing of President Masoud Pezeshkian or Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the expense of the Supreme Leader and the security establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Yet what the U.S. administration appears to have overlooked is that Iran does not operate as either a conventional state or a terrorist organization, despite how the latter in particular is often portrayed in Washington policy circles, where the removal of the top leadership would automatically lead to regime collapse.
While Venezuela was not a terrorist state, the existence of an institutional opposition with meaningful political capital enabled a rapid transfer of power away from Nicolás Maduro toward a figure favoured by Washington. Iran presents a fundamentally different case. The Islamic Republic is not structured as a strictly top-down hierarchy in which the elimination of senior leadership figures would trigger systemic collapse and replacement by actors acceptable to Washington. Rather, Iran contains multiple centers of power that act as mutual checks. Should the United States attempt to consolidate the political authority of figures such as Pezeshkian or Ghalibaf, this would likely further discredit them in the eyes of other institutional power centers, which would perceive them as aligned with an invading force.
Geography, Not Nuclear Power, Is the New Leverage
A second miscalculation lies in the assumption that, in the absence of a nuclear arsenal capable of deterring external intervention, Iran lacks the strategic leverage necessary to impose significant costs on adversaries. Despite repeated efforts over the years, Tehran has not succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons.
However, its primary source of strategic leverage may never have been nuclear capability, but rather its geography. Iran’s direct control over the Strait of Hormuz, its indirect influence over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait via its Houthi proxy, and its proximity to Gulf monarchies that are strategically aligned with the United States and host American military bases provide Tehran with substantial leverage. This positioning enables what can now be described as a strategy of “deterrence by punishment”. Iran is currently undergoing a process of strategic recalibration. For years, Tehran’s political and security leadership adhered to a doctrine of “strategic patience” aimed at avoiding a U.S. (or U.S.-Israeli coordinated) military intervention on Iranian territory.
This approach was evident following the assassination of the Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, when Iran’s retaliatory strike was significantly more limited and symbolic than its rhetoric regarding crossed red lines might have suggested. However, the 12-day conflict with Israel in June effectively dismantled this strategy. Strategic patience was interpreted in Washington and Tel Aviv not as restraint but as weakness, and it ultimately invited rather than deterred conflict along Iran’s borders. The March conflict demonstrated that Iran is prepared to take decisive action in retaliation. It deployed drones and missiles against critical and energy infrastructure in the Gulf, closed the Strait of Hormuz, and imposed significant costs on global energy markets. From the outset, it is clear that Venezuela has never possessed comparable geographic leverage, at least not at a similar scale.
A Potential Iraq or Afghanistan?
A third potential miscalculation (yet in the making) for the United States would be to pursue a ground invasion of Iran similar to those undertaken in the past in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would likely represent the most serious strategic error, as it ignores the previously mentioned dynamics.
Even if one assumes that such an invasion could succeed and that the theocratic regime in Tehran would collapse under the pressure of U.S. and Israeli military force, a critical question remains: who would replace it? As long as the monopoly over military power remains in the hands of the regime, and no alternative military centers exist within the country, the regime would likely collapse only temporarily before regrouping and reasserting itself later. The costs for the United States of remaining in Iran to ensure the survival of a new leadership, supported by American troops on the ground, would be considerable, and it is highly unlikely that President Donald Trump would be willing to bear such costs after criticising similar approaches in other parts of the world. There is no equivalent in Iran to Syria’s Idlib or Libya’s Benghazi. Power would remain concentrated either in the hands of the current regime or in a new regime dependent on U.S. military backing, at least until the point at which continued American presence becomes unsustainable.
Even if the United States were to pursue a strategy of ethnic militarization, whether among Arabs in Khuzestan, Kurds in the northwest, or Baloch populations in the southeast, there is no guarantee that these groups would maintain their alignment with a Washington-supported regime, particularly given the risk of strong retaliation from Iran’s security establishment. Experiences in Iraq and Syria suggest that Kurdish actors, for example, have prioritized regional autonomy over regime change.
Additionally, the United States cannot impose a new regime that does not already exist in a latent or broadly accepted form within Iran. While protests in Tehran during the past winter were widespread, they were not coordinated by a charismatic political leader willing to assume long-term responsibility. Again, there was no Iranian equivalent of Delcy Rodríguez. Moreover, several competing political alternatives exist in exile, including monarchist factions centered around Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah, nationalist movements, and Islamist-Marxist groups such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq. What these groups share is a common objective, the fall of the Islamic Republic, but not a unified vision of what should follow, particularly once the leadership collapses and the regime lose its monopoly on force.
Furthermore, any ground invasion would aim, among other objectives, to establish U.S.-Israeli control over the Strait of Hormuz in order to reduce the costs imposed by maritime disruption on global energy markets. However, there is a significant gap between strategic objectives and operational timelines. While the objective may be to secure control through superior U.S.-Israeli military capabilities against a relatively limited Iranian naval force, achieving this would require time and resources. Iran’s territory is vast, and advancing toward Hormuz through a northern invasion route would be slow. Alternatively, an invasion launched from the south, through the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Oman, would necessitate control over Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island, both central to Iran’s defensive architecture, where coalition forces would operate in hostile territory. An invasion originating from Kuwait, targeting entry through the oil-rich, Arab-majority province of Khuzestan, would require passage through Iraq, raising the risk of confrontation with Iranian-aligned Shiite militias operating under the Popular Mobilization Forces.
In all scenarios, strategic objectives would not be achieved immediately, leaving Iran with sufficient time to respond forcefully, by leveraging again its ”geographical weapons”. This could include mining the Strait of Hormuz, blocking Bab el-Mandeb via Houthi forces and thus disrupting Saudi oil exports to Asian markets, targeting the Saudi Petroline, or further damaging gas infrastructure in Qatar. Iran does not require weeks to respond; it needs only to understand U.S. intentions, geography can do the rest, not nuclear weapons.
The United States May Be Seeking a Syrian or Cuban Outcome—Without Triggering a North Korean Scenario
Returning to the original U.S. calculation, the coordinated U.S.-Israeli strikes appear to have been designed as a direct, external, and rapid intervention aimed at significantly degrading Iran’s military capabilities. The objective was to introduce doubt and uncertainty among Iran’s defence and security decision-makers. Once the cohesion of the security apparatus is weakened and internal fractures emerge within the leadership, the regime itself would become vulnerable, fragmented, divided, and ultimately defeated by alternative centers of military power.
In this framework, Syria represents the preferred scenario for Israel and, likely, the initial objective pursued by Washington from day one. Once Bashar al-Assad’s monopoly over military power eroded, his regime was ultimately defeated by opposition forces that seized control of Damascus and established a new leadership more willing to normalize relations with Washington. However, Iran differs fundamentally. As already emphasized, there are no alternative military power centers within the Islamic Republic capable of exploiting such fragmentation. The theocratic regime in Tehran continues to maintain a monopoly over the use of force. Moreover, as long as the regime retains the capacity to suppress internal dissent, the perception of absolute control remains deeply embedded within the population. Ultimately, there are no visible fractures at the highest levels of leadership. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader shortly after the death of his father signals institutional cohesion rather than weakness. In the face of externally imposed casualties, the leadership has closed ranks rather than fragmented.
Consequently, whether a Syrian-type outcome could materialize in Iran depends not on external intervention, but on internal fragmentation. Time will determine whether such fragmentation emerges, but time does not appear to favour Washington. Energy markets are already experiencing elevated prices, with Brent crude reaching three-digit levels. President Donald Trump is reportedly considering various measures to stabilize markets, including the potential lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, an option that could provide the current regime with critical financial relief. For its part, Tehran is acutely aware of these dynamics. Minimizing military costs has never been its primary objective; survival by any means has been the central goal. For the regime, each additional day of endurance constitutes a strategic victory.
An alternative scenario, and the one preferred by Gulf monarchies which are among the most directly affected by the conflict, is not the Syrian model but rather a Cuban outcome. Under this approach, the objective is not necessarily regime fragmentation and collapse, but containment. In essence, the goal is not to eliminate the threat, but to quarantine it. This preference reflects a strong security rationale. Drawing on the experiences of Iraq and Libya, Gulf states recognize that regime collapse often creates a power vacuum that invites instability. This argument was also central to Assad’s narrative in Syria, where he consistently maintained that the costs of regime collapse would exceed those of preserving his rule. For Gulf states, regional stability under a weak and contained Iranian regime is preferable to the uncertainty associated with its forced collapse.
However, the Cuban scenario does not appear to align with Israel’s strategic objectives. Israeli political and military leaders view the current conflict as an opportunity to permanently remove the Iranian regime. Israel seeks precisely the Syrian outcome: fragmentation, collapse, and the dismantling of Iran’s capacity to project power regionally, particularly through its network of proxies against Israel. At the same time, Israel is aware that the conflict has created an unprecedented opportunity for close coordination with the United States in efforts to weaken or remove the regime in Tehran. Yet Israeli decision-makers also understand that this window of opportunity is narrowing, as the balance of costs and benefits may increasingly push Washington toward de-escalation, even if that means accepting the survival of the regime. Having initially benefited from U.S. alignment toward a Syrian-type outcome, Israel now appears focused on imposing maximum costs on Iran in anticipation of a possible U.S. shift toward a Cuban-style containment strategy.
Whether Iran ultimately follows a Syrian or Cuban trajectory will depend largely on the level of escalation, specifically, whether Israel can keep the United States committed to sustained military pressure in the hope that internal fragmentation will eventually lead to regime collapse, or whether Washington opts to reduce escalation in favour of containment. While Gulf states appear to favour the Cuban scenario, the decision to escalate or de-escalate lies beyond their control, at least for now. It remains uncertain to what extent U.S. and Israeli decision-makers will prioritize Gulf security concerns.
Ultimately, the outcome may be neither Syrian nor Cuban, but rather North Korean, particularly given the divergence between Israel’s preference for regime collapse and the Gulf’s preference for containment. This scenario is grounded in the logic that the longer a regime survives under pressure, the more dangerous and assertive it becomes. This dynamic may already be observable. The current leadership in Tehran, which replaced figures eliminated in U.S.-Israeli strikes, is more radical, more hardline, and less risk-averse than its predecessors. The previous leadership had been associated with the strategy of “strategic patience,” which ultimately failed by signaling weakness and inviting external attacks. The new leadership, by contrast, appears convinced that greater assertiveness was required as early as October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its coordinated attack against Israel in alignment with the broader Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shiite militias. The decision by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to allow proxy groups to confront a militarily superior Israel largely on their own was perceived as a sign of weakness and institutional disunity. The current leadership has not repeated that approach. It has responded immediately and forcefully, striking Gulf states and asserting control over the Strait of Hormuz. Its strategy is to communicate unequivocally to the United States and Israel that any attack on Iran will generate substantial costs. This reflects an effort to establish a credible long-term deterrent that will discourage future interventions on the Iranian territory (either with or without the proxy infrastructure as a defence buffer).
Just as North Korea relies on its nuclear arsenal to sustain deterrence, Iran is seeking to achieve a comparable effect through its geographic leverage. The message is clear: have the United States and Israel paid a sufficiently high price to deter future conflict?
Conclusion
A Venezuelan-style scenario can be ruled out from the outset due to the absence of an opposition leader with sufficient political and institutional capital to assume responsibility for a transition and to secure broad acceptance across the population. Recent protests have mobilized large numbers of participants, yet they have lacked a unified leadership capable of articulating and sustaining a coherent political direction. Furthermore, the institutional architecture of the Islamic Republic is structured around multiple centers of power, meaning that the removal of a single leader does not automatically precipitate regime collapse, as other power centers are positioned to fill the resulting vacuum.
Interventions modeled on Iraq or Afghanistan would be difficult to implement given Iran’s rugged terrain, vast geographic scale, and mountainous landscape, which shields the plateau on which Tehran is located. Moreover, even if Gulf states were to support a ground intervention in Iran, the resulting political outcome might not align with their interests. The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq created a power vacuum that allowed extremist groups to flourish and consolidate. A similar collapse in Iran would likely produce an even larger vacuum, and Gulf states are inherently wary of the uncertainty such an outcome would generate.
A Syrian-style scenario also appears unlikely in the absence of significant alternative military forces capable of exerting internal pressure on the regime while external strikes degrade Iran’s military capabilities and potentially trigger fragmentation within the security leadership. As in Iraq and Libya, Gulf states may view such a scenario with concern, given that regime collapse would likely be followed by an internal struggle for power and prolonged instability.
The Cuban scenario, favoured by the Gulf states and potentially considered by the United States, appears most closely aligned with current realities. As long as the regime remains internally cohesive, it is likely to be weakened externally rather than fragmented. U.S.-Israeli strikes have significantly degraded Iran’s military capabilities without producing internal division or undermining institutional unity. The containment of the regime, rather than its collapse, is consistent with Iran’s recently adopted strategy of deterrence by punishment. As long as the regime, though weakened, remains intact, it achieves precisely what the new leadership seeks: the establishment of a sufficiently credible deterrent to discourage future attacks or threats to the regime.
Under conditions of containment, the Strait of Hormuz would likely remain open and not subject to prolonged militarization. As long as regime survival is ensured, Tehran has little incentive to impose additional economic costs by targeting Gulf infrastructure or disrupting maritime routes. This outcome may also align with U.S. interests.
However, the Cuban scenario presents two significant challenges. In the short term, Israel is unlikely to accept it. Israeli leadership views Iran’s current military weakness as a strategic opportunity to eliminate the regime entirely and neutralize all associated threats. Moreover, in the absence of the Islamic Republic and its network of regional proxies, Israeli primacy in the Middle East is more achievable than ever. Therefore, even if the United States and Gulf states were to accept a containment approach, Israel may continue to escalate, either to push toward a Syrian-style fragmentation and collapse from the inside, or even toward an Iraq-style forced regime change through ground intervention from the outside. Even in the absence of full U.S. support, continued Israeli escalation would likely compel Tehran to impose maximum costs by leveraging its geographic advantages.
In the longer term, the Cuban scenario risks evolving into a North Korean trajectory. Like Cuba, North Korea experienced prolonged isolation; however, under those conditions, it became increasingly militarized, assertive, and ultimately nuclear-armed. The regime in Pyongyang remained internally cohesive despite severe economic sanctions and external pressure. If North Korea was once militarily weak during its initial period of containment, it grew stronger within that isolation. A similar dynamic could unfold in Iran. Indeed, the pre-JCPOA period (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iranian Nuclear Deal), during which Iran advanced its nuclear ambitions under conditions of international sanctions and isolation, suggests the plausibility of such a trajectory.
However, an important distinction must be made. In the case of North Korea, there was little expectation, even among the United States, South Korea, or Japan, that internal fragmentation would occur despite economic pressure. The historical and social homogeneity of North Korea is not replicable in Iran. Iran continues to face internal tensions between the central regime in Tehran and its ethnic peripheries, compounded by periodic waves of civil unrest on a scale not observed in Pyongyang. Chants such as “Death to Khamenei” have been heard repeatedly in major Iranian cities in the past, an unimaginable development in North Korea, where no comparable public dissent has been directed at the Kim family. Persistent internal pressure from both peripheral regions and civil society is likely to slow any acceleration of a military nuclear program compared to North Korea, which benefited from external assistance, notably through Pakistan’s illicit proliferation network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan.
Given the economic constraints imposed by sanctions and political isolation, both the assertiveness and the overall strength of the Iranian regime may be limited, even if not fundamentally threatened by internal dynamics. Ultimately, the regime must simultaneously manage domestic repression and strategic military ambitions within the constraints of finite resources.
In the end, this situation might initially look similar to the pre-conflict status quo, though with some important caveats. First, the military posture of the Islamic Republic regime will be severely depleted compared to the period before the conflict, while the regime will also be, indefinitely, more internationally isolated than it previously was. Severe economic isolation implies that the financial and material costs of rebuilding military capabilities will be significantly higher. Leadership-level internal cohesion is expected to remain intact, particularly after the regime succeeded in enduring weeks (possibly months) of military pressure, but unlike North Korea, the authorities in Tehran will continue to face internal pressure stemming from domestic dissent and unrest in ethnically peripheral regions. Domestic dissent is likely to grow as the long-term costs of economic and political isolation begin to take effect, and as is usually the case, the general population will bear the brunt of the consequences of decisions taken by the current leadership first and most heavily. Nevertheless, as long as the regime maintains a monopoly on the use of force, combined with ongoing domestic repression, and in the absence of alternative domestic military actors elsewhere in the country as well as a broadly recognized and unified popular opposition, the regime will remain afloat despite being militarily weaker. Consequently, the outcome represents a fragile victory for the Islamic Republic regime.
Second, this outcome implies that Iran’s strategic deterrent remains effective in preventing further aggression, particularly if Israel ultimately comes to accept a weakened but contained Iran. This would constitute the regime’s greatest success. It demonstrates that geography can be as critical to deterrence as nuclear weapons themselves. It could also create opportunities for other states to seek to maximize the strategic value of their geographic position. All of a sudden, geography becomes fashionable, at least among states that perceive strategic leverage in their location.
Israel may appear as a clear loser in this context, as it has—and potentially misses—the opportunity to decisively finish the job once and for all; otherwise, it will merely revert to countering Iran’s projection of power throughout the region and against Israel itself. However, this situation cannot remain exactly the same as before. Complete isolation means that Iran will require more resources than in the past to sustain and support its proxy network across the Middle East. Proxy groups grew militarily because of continuous Iranian transfer of weapons or inputs. But now, Iran will prioritize domestic military recovery over arming its smaller partners, especially when resources become limited. Isolation in this case could imply a reduction either in the size or the intensity of the Iranian-patronized Axis of Resistance, especially now that Tehran has recognized that its geographic leverage constitutes a more powerful deterrent than the proxy network, which failed in preventing Israel and the United States from directly attacking Iran. And this outcome represents a gain for Israel.
Bibliography:
Vlad Ciobanu on Energy Market Shock & Strategic Outlook in the Middle East Caused by Iranian Disruptions - Asian Atlas
Syria's Lessons for Regime Change in Iran
