From the end of the 19th century, Iran's (then Persia) foreign policy interest was based on the notion of "political independence and territorial integrity."[1] This would also be the `raison d'être` behind the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.[2] But the 1979 Iranian Revolution changed the paradigm of Iranian foreign policy and the interest behind its execution shifted towards exporting the revolution outside the national borders rather than seeking the execution of a foreign policy for the good of Iran's interest as a nation-state.[3] [4] The foreign policy determinants of the Islamic Republic can be categorized according to two periods: the Khomeinist revolutionary decade (1979-1989), which bears the imprint of the founding father and the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the period of pragmatism following the death of Khomeini in 1989 and the appointment of Ali Khamenei as his successor and the naming of Hashemi Rafsanjani as President of the Islamic Republic.[5]

With the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the interest behind the execution of Iran`s foreign policy shifted from nation-state interests such as "political independence and territorial integrity" towards a more globalized approach based on Ruhollah Khomeini's interpretation of the Twelver Shia jurisprudence.[6] Therefore, unworthy nationalist concepts (according to Khomeini) such as ``national interest`` were to be replaced by the notion of worldwide Islamic governance.[7] According to Khomeini the interest behind the Islamic Republic`s foreign policy is the export of revolution and the establishment of an Islamic world order. This was to be enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic, "in the development of international relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community … and to ensure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed people in the world.” [8] Under the foreign policy slogan ``Neither East, nor West, but the Islamic Republic``, Khomeini believed that Islam came as a blessing for all mankind, not limited only to Muslims. Islamic principles would fill an ideological void in an international society dominated by materialism, and people who would accept these principles would truly embrace salvation.[9] This `ideological-Islamic interest` was translated into the Islamic Republic`s foreign policy determinants of the time.[10] Instead of seeking to consolidate Iran's interest as nation-states, Tehran would venture on a holy mission to further export the Islamic revolution and to liberate the oppressed people from the subjugation of materialism by embracing the holy virtues of Islam as promoted by the Islamic Republic. An example that reinforces the opinion that Iran's foreign policy pursues this religious reasoning is the 1982 Iranian military campaign further on inside Baathist Iraq after it already liberated the Iranian territory from the invading forces of Saddam Hussein. This justifies exactly the Khomeinist religious mission of exporting the revolution into Iraqi territory that goes beyond just protecting Iranian territorial integrity (what would have been solely a national interest), and ``liberate`` the Shiite majority people from an oppressive Sunni ruling class.[11] A second example is given by Iranian foreign policy toward the Gulf monarchies during the 1980s as it believed that the administrative structures of Gulf monarchies and their ties with the United States run counter to the Islamic principles promoted by Tehran. The annually clashes between the Iranian pilgrims in Mecca during the Hajj and the Saudi security forces trying to contain their political demonstration in the name of exporting the revolution, is a good example in this matter.[12]

The death of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989 signalled the shift from an `ideological-Islamic interest` approach towards a `pragmatic-Islamic interest`.[13] [14] This change has led to the formation of new foreign policies to pursue Iran's national interests. From now on, Iranian foreign policy would be about the Iranian interest as nation-state, more about the priority of political independence and territorial integrity and less about the global religious mission of exporting the Islamic revolution and bringing all oppressed people under an Islamic `moral` order.[15] [16] Even the goal of exporting the Islamic revolution by any means was replaced by a more pragmatic approach of acting by example for other countries to follow suit.[17] This era of pragmatic foreign policy was marked by the dual leadership of the new Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hashemi Rafsanjani.[18] An example justifying the fact that Iran's foreign policy at this time abandoned religious reasoning to the detriment of the traditional interest of the nation-state is the diplomatic openness to Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia in the 1990s (as opposed to the old interest of exporting the Islamic revolution there) based on the presumption that the security of the Persian Gulf is exponential for Iranian national security and its integrity as a nation state, while the economic attractiveness of their markets for Iranian exports would bring Iran economic benefits.[19] [20] This rapprochement with the Gulf was made at the expense of supporting the Iraqi Shi`is during the 1991 Gulf War, underlining once again that it is Iran geostrategic interests now more important than the Islamic religious rationale (even Shiite).[21] Another example of acting in the name of national interest is the positive diplomatic rapprochement to the former USSR (now independent) republics of Central Asia that could put Iran in a favourable economic position as a transit country for the natural resources of the Caspian Sea basin to worldwide markets through the Persian Gulf.[22] [23] This interest was at the basis of Iran's foreign policy goal of brokering the membership of Central Asia republics within the Economic Cooperation Organization.[24] [25] Tehran has sought at the beginning of the 1990s the establishment of good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan as their war in Nagorno Karabakh between 1988-1994 posed a threat to Iranian security, while the balance of support more in favour of Armenia (a Christian nation) against Azerbaijan (a country with a Shi`ite majority population), shows the priority of geopolitical interests in the execution of foreign policies at the expense of the religious discourse.[26] [27]

The emphasis on Iran's interest as a nation-state at the expense of the revolutionary zeal for exporting Islamic principles and the formation of a new Islamic order, brought it not only partners and an end to isolation, but brought back the (necessary) discussion about the vulnerability of Iranian security.[28] [29] According to Hobbesian theory of realist international relations, insecurity leads to the weaponization of foreign policy.[30] The vulnerability during the war with Iraq and the expanded US military presence in both the West (Iraq) and the East (Afghanistan) were the main reasons why Iran sought weaponization, which in turn threw it back into the isolation specific to the Khomeinist period.[31] The best way Iran can break this vicious circle is to continue to act with pragmatism in international affairs, to distance itself as much as possible from a return to the revolutionary zeal and to counter as much as possible the radical and ultra-conservative voices in Tehran in order to be convincing in international negotiations that Iran speaks with one voice, and that voice is pragmatic and moderate. In doing this, Iran will not be demoted as a fundamentalist, fanatical, ideological and irrational state with a problematic Orientalist or `Middleeasterness` character, and either will be accepted into the nuclear club (like India and Pakistan), or a nuclear weaponization will no longer be necessary as the international community (mostly the US) will provide Iran sufficient security guarantees in order to renounce weaponization as Iran has always sought it for defence (against Iraq and now the US military presence), rather than for an aggression (against Israel or US military forces in the region).[32] [33]

[1] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 214.

[2] Ibidem.

[3] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 133-134.

[4] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, pp. 214-216.

[5] Ibidem, pp. 214-221.

[6] Ibidem, p. 214.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 134.

[9] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, pp. 214-215.

[10] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 134-135.

[11] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 215.

[12] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, pp. 215-216.

[13] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 136-139.

[14] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 217.

[15] Ibidem.

[16] Olivier Roy, The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, Middle East Journal, Spring, 1999, Vol 53, no 2, (Spring, 1999), p. 211.

[17] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 217.

[18] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 136-139.

[19] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, pp. 219-221.

[20] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 141-142.

[21] Olivier Roy, The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, Middle East Journal, Spring, 1999, Vol 53, no 2, (Spring, 1999), p. 211.

[22] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, pp. 220-221.

[23] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 142-143.

[24] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 221.

[25] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 143.

[26] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 221.

[27] Olivier Roy, The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, Middle East Journal, Spring, 1999, Vol 53, no 2, (Spring, 1999), p. 211.

[28] Gawdat Bahgat (2006), Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Studies, 39:3, 307-327, DOI: 10.1080/00210860600808102, p. 321.

[29] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 218.

[30] Shampa Biswas (2018), Iran v ‘the international community’: a postcolonial analysis of the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, Asian Journal of Political Science, 26:3, 331-351, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2018.1481441, p. 333.

[31] Gawdat Bahgat (2006), Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Studies, 39:3, 307-327, DOI: 10.1080/00210860600808102, pp. 313-314.

[32] Ibidem, pp. 318-320.

[33] Ibidem, pp. 319-320.

Bibliography:

Arjomand, Amir, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012.

Bahgat, Gawdat, (2006), Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Studies, 39:3, 307-327, DOI: 10.1080/00210860600808102.

Biswas, Shampa, (2018), Iran v ‘the international community’: a postcolonial analysis of the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, Asian Journal of Political Science, 26:3, 331-351, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2018.1481441.

Ramazani, R.K., Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``.

Roy, Olivier, The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, Middle East Journal, Spring, 1999, Vol 53, no 2, (Spring, 1999).